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Abstract 
Joseph Weiler’s 1991 article, The Transformation of Europe (TOE), was undoubtedly a 
landmark in European legal scholarship, but it also marked a watershed in its author’s own 
approach to the European project. European legal scholarship was never the same after TOE, 
but nor was Joseph Weiler’s contribution to that body of scholarship. In some ways, a shift in 
perspective is to be expected. TOE was an agenda-reshaping piece, and it is only natural that 
its author should follow the new agenda that he did so much to set. That is one part of the 
story. However, I believe that it is also the case that the author gradually came to understand 
the new agenda to be less relevant, or less ‘actionable’ than previously he had, and in any 
case less central, either because the world had simply moved on yet again in new and 
unpredictable ways, or, perhaps, because the agenda had never been as open as he once 
believed. In this retrospective comment, I explore both parts of the story. I examine what they 
tell us about the evolving character of supranational Europe as a political project and also as a 
field of inquiry, and how this movement is both reflected in and touched by the thought of 
one of the leading jurists of the age. In particular, I examine Weiler's post-TOE thesis of 
political Messianism as a way of accounting for both the early success and the recent loss of 
momentum of the EU. And in introducing the metaphor of the 'half-life' as the characteristic 
of an entity in irreversible decline, I address the following issues: whether and to what extent 
Weilers' views on the trajectory of Supranational Europe are consistent with such a 
metaphorical depiction; precisely what such a depiction entails in terms of the EU's 
prognosis; and how this approach might be challenged. 
 
Keywords 
Weiler, Suprantionalism, EU, Peace, Prosperity, Messianism, Half-life, Community 
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A European Half-Life? 
A Retrospective on Joseph Weiler’s The Transformation of Europe 
  
Neil Walker 
 
Joseph Weiler’s The Transformation of Europe (TOE)1 was undoubtedly a landmark in 
European legal scholarship, but it also marked a watershed in its author’s own approach to the 
European project.  European legal scholarship was never quite the same after TOE, but nor 
was Joseph Weiler’s contribution to that body of scholarship. In some ways, a shift in his 
perspective is to be expected.  TOE was an agenda-reshaping piece, and it is only natural that 
its author should follow the new agenda that he did so much to set. That, indeed, is a large 
part of the story, but still only one part. It is also the case, I believe, that the author gradually 
came to understand the new agenda to be less relevant, or less ‘actionable’ than previously he 
had, and in any case less central, either because the world had simply moved on yet again in 
new and unpredictable ways, or, perhaps, because the agenda had never been as open as he 
once believed.  In this retrospective comment, I want to explore both parts of the story. I want 
to examine what they tell us about the evolving character of supranational Europe as a 
political project and also as a field of inquiry, and how this movement is both reflected in and 
touched by the thought of one of the leading jurists of the age. 
What was the new agenda? The originality of TOE lay in its deep diagnosis of the legal and 
political condition of supranational Europe. Previous legal scholarship had tended to adopt an 
insider line, taking the fact and the value of the post-war new European order for granted - as 
                                               
1
  (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal  2403-2483  
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/01 
 
Page 2 of 18 
 
something to be affirmed, defended and incrementally developed as a ‘good thing’. TOE told 
a more challenging tale. Drawing heavily on historical materials, and more lightly, but 
effectively, on contributions from the non-legal sciences of Europeanization, it presented a 
picture of European integration that was more dynamic but also more precarious and less 
insular than the received wisdom. According to the fresh narrative, legal supranationalism 
was no longer to be viewed as a mere projection and epiphenomenon of concerted ‘high’ 
political will, nor was it to be understood as somehow detached or sealed off from any 
immediate sense of political partisanship or contestation. One or both of these perspectives, 
each tending to situate law in an unproblematic and settled relationship with the ‘political’, 
were implicit in the dominant model of legal scholarship. In TOE  the legal and the political 
domains were instead depicted as having long been in a relationship of complex, inverted 
symbiosis. The   stepwise ‘locking in’ of robust legal supranationalism, measured in terms of  
increase in the authority, reach and enforcement capacity of European legal norms, was 
portrayed as both condition and reinforced consequence of weak political centralism, 
measured in terms  of the maintenance of strong state-executive and so 'intergovernmental' 
control of the process of law-making at European level. Intergovernmental control went 
against  the grain - or at least the long-term vision - of the more communautaire  foundational 
texts of the Paris of 1951 and Rome of 1957, but had been vigorously re-asserted by Charles 
De Gaulle in the events leading  up to  the  1966 Luxembourg Compromise and its 
consolidation of the national veto over key European decisions. 
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     Yet this relationship was already unravelling by the time it was diagnosed in TOE.
2
  The       
Single European Act in 1987, soon to be reinforced by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, had 
altered the subtle balance between strong legal authority and modest political capability  at 
the European centre. The introduction of qualified majority voting in the area of the 
‘completion’ of the single market and, progressively, in other flanking areas of social and 
economic policy, together with the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament as an 
actor in the legislative process, constituted an important if partial move towards political 
supranationalism or neo-federalism. This, in turn, meant that Europe was faced with a new 
set of possibilities,  but also with a new set of dangers and constraints.   
        As Weiler sets out in the closing pages of TOE, Europe thus transformed was faced with 
new challenges of democracy and legitimacy, and the meeting of these challenges was bound 
to be further transformative. The development of majoritarian legislative authority at the 
centre raised the question of the deep democratic credentials of a wider Europe of such ample 
new political means. It did so as a  matter of  absolute standards, and, of more immediate 
consequence, it also did so relative to the much longer established more firmly embedded 
democratic claims of the member states themselves, whose independent authority was eroded 
or threatened by these centripetal forces. What is more, the combination of the aggressive 
promotion of the single market under the '1992' Programme and its relocation, post-
Maastricht, within a deeper framework of Economic and Monetary Union, the  palpable sense 
of a broadening of the supranational agenda to cover other, politically controversial and only 
loosely single-market-implicated areas of social policy such as internal security, defence and 
environmental policy, and the growing likelihood of national governments in power being 
                                               
2
 Although Weiler had in fact developed the rudiments of the TOE thesis in an earlier article; see “The 
Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism" (1981) 1 Yearbook of European Law 
(1981) 267-306. 
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bound against their will by the accumulation of  regulatory initiatives at the centre, meant that 
the legal-technocratic cloak of ideological neutrality which had long shielded the European 
project from political controversy looked increasingly threadbare. Europe now had to come to 
terms with the higher and more controversial profile of its common institutions. And in so 
doing, less reliance than previously could be placed  on the loyalty, quiet diplomacy and 
pragmatic idealism of its officials, judges and various national fellow-travelling elites to drive 
its agenda and valorise its operations. In moving forward under these altered conditions, 
according to Weiler, Europe was faced with starker choices. It would take either the path of 
Unity - of federal statehood writ large, or, as he himself would prefer, and would claim to be 
the way more faithful to the European project's formative post-war ethos, of Community – of 
a novel and subtly balanced condition between internationalism and statehood.  
        This idea of Community had both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ components. At its hard material and 
institutional end it was premised on a limited sharing of sovereignty, and a gradually 
thickening structure of policy and institutional interdependence. At the ‘soft’ cultural and 
ethical end, it was premised on the development of a new political sensibility and on the 
altered moral horizons associated with that new political sensibility; in particular, on the 
mutual complementarity of a bounded idea of national identity and a more inclusive sense of 
a continental  identity of values and aspirations.  In each dimension of Community,  ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’, the  trick lay in finding a way of political being which, crudely, was neither too 
little nor too much. On the one hand, the new Europe had always been more than the mere 
instrument of its states, its value more than the aggregation and its authority more than the 
delegation of their various and separate self-interests. And in the exercise of its extended, 
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more transparent and more potentially state-antagonizing capacity, Europe would have to 
find ways to safeguard and justify that relative autonomy from its original sources of power. 
On the other hand, Europe would have to assert itself  in a manner that did not destroy its 
own distinctive raison d’être as an accompaniment to rather than a new embodiment of the 
nation state, as an entity that qualified rather undermined, supplemented rather than 
supplanted, complemented rather than copied the  constituent states of Europe. 
     So the new agenda set by TOE was one in which European law lost its rarefied, 
always/already quality.  It was one where legal scholars not only were persuaded to take a 
greater interest in the historical origins of the European project as a way of understanding the 
contingency of the present and of accessing the framing conditions of a uncertain future, but  
also were drawn to address directly normative questions and institutional-design puzzles 
about the shaping of that uncertain future.  
      As already intimated, this agenda explains much of the trajectory of Weiler’s own later 
work. The essays that formed the second part of his 1999 collection The Constitution of 
Europe
3
 – a collection in which, tellingly, TOE re-appears as the anchoring essay - were 
mostly taken from the post-TOE  years. Much more than his earlier work, which, like TOE 
itself, tended to be  concerned with diagnosis of the deep and distinctive structure of EU law 
(and, sometimes, as in his work on human rights, external relations  or the free movement of 
goods, with its precise doctrinal implications),
4
 this later seam of writing was explicitly 
                                               
3
  (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1999), chapters 6-10. For my Review, see “All Dressed 
Up” (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 563-82.  
4
 See Weiler n3, chapters 3 and 4 on human rights and external relations respectively.  On the free 
movement of goods, see his, "The Constitution of the Common-Market Place: Text and Context in the 
Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods", in P. Craig and G. de Búrca  The Evolution of EU Law ( 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1999, 1st edition)  349-375.  
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normative. In particular, it was concerned to explore and deepen what Weiler meant by his 
preference for Community over Unity, and to do so both in 'hard'  and 'soft'  terms.  It was the 
work in which he addressed the challenge of revitalizing the congealing values of Peace and 
Prosperity, which he had identified as constituting the ethical heart of  the original project of 
a continent devastated by war;  in which he argued for supranational democracy as a vital but, 
finally, instrumental good of the continental polity - empty without a reinvestment in core 
values; in which he developed his ideas about the ‘taming’ rather than replacement of  
national by  European identity – the one concerned with the retention of that culture of 
originality and belonging inextricable from and vital to primary political community at the 
state level, the other inhabiting a more cosmopolitan and so other-regarding  sensibility; and 
in which he began to develop his  notion of  Tolerance, and in particular national tolerance of 
and self-discipline before the supranational edifice and its wide-ranging  normative message 
as to the acceptance of the non-national ‘other’, as the lodestar of European constitutionalism 
– an argument which would come to form part of his later powerful opposition to the top-
down imposition of a documentary Constitution for Europe against the backdrop of the failed 
constitutional initiative of 2003-5. 
5
   
      Yet this is only one part of the story, and essentially the first part. In more recent years 
the writings of Weiler, always a healthy corrective to unthinking Euro-complacency or glib 
Euro-optimism, have taken a more pessimistic turn. Where once Supranationality, offered in 
the upper case  as the animating structural ideal  - the 'x' factor of integration - supplying both 
the institutional hardware and the ethical software for the substantive ideals of Peace and 
                                               
5
  See e.g. Weiler, “A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 563; “On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography” (2005) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 173-90. 
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Prosperity,
6
  was an elusive yet preciously defining feature of the European Sonderweg, now 
it began to look plain elusive. For the tension that Weiler identified with such acuity in TOE 
between too much and too little - between preventing the excesses of a new Unity on the one 
hand and avoiding a failure of Community to renew its credentials under conditions  of 
greater political capacity, increased public profile and more diverse and more insistent 
political challenge on the other, now threatened, in his eyes, to collapse into a series of 
intractable problems. 
       In particular, a much emphasised  and recently repeated theme of his post-TOE work has 
been  the difficulty of replacing or replenishing the original motivational ideals of Prosperity  
and Peace in a time of relative plenty, however unevenly distributed, and in a place where the  
sound  of War is  now  only heard from beyond its borders.
7
 In seeking to demonstrate this 
loss of momentum, Weiler is critical, and not without reason, of the stubborn lack of clear 
and democratically sensitive lines of accountability within the European institutional balance, 
of the sustained absence of true political contestation at the European level, and of the stark 
contrast between the ebbing of popular interest and participation in European elections and 
the ever greater mobilisation of national support behind profoundly anti-European parties. If 
this echoes a common catalogue of complaint, Weiler has also,  more distinctively,  been  
critical  of what he sees as a gradually hardening deficit of effective political capacity and 
resolve on the part of the EU's leading institutions. This failure, for him, was  manifest, for 
example,  in the EU's  ineffectual response to conflict amongst its near neighbours - in 
particular to  humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, and,   more recently, in its absence 
                                               
6 See Weiler, n3 chapter 7; "Fin de Siècle Europe: do the new Clothes have an Emperor?"  
7
  See in particular  Weiler “60 Years since the First European Community- Reflections on Political 
Messianism” (2011) 22 EJIL 303-311; "The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An 
Exploratory Essay (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 678-694; "In the Face of Crisis: 
Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and European Integration"  (2012) 34 Journal of European 
Integration 825-841. 
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from the top table  in respect of intervention in Libya, and its reluctance to make common 
cause of the problems generated by the pressure of mass immigration from Northern Africa. 
And, of course,  more   topically still  and most urgently of all, this lack of resolve  has also 
been evident  in the EU's repeated failure to contain or reverse  its rapidly escalating and 
widely ramified sovereign debt crisis. Importantly, however,  unlike so many other analyses,  
for whom the current parlous state of the Union is quite distinct in  profundity from anything 
that preceded it and essentially rooted in macro-economic factors, for Weiler, without in any 
way seeking to underplay the significance or urgency of  the threat to economic and monetary 
union, the immediate crisis is instead viewed as essentially continuous with a longer and 
broader pattern of political impotence. 
      Weiler sees the accumulation of democratic ills and of decision-making black spots  and 
policy haemorrhages as deeply symptomatic of political drift, as a running indictment of  a 
failure to meet the challenge of political renewal which the 1990s – the original age of 
transformation – presented in such stark form. And this critique is underscored by two 
additional sceptical themes, both of which focus on the limitations of the ‘hard’ institutional 
side of the formula for Community. On the one hand, for all that he is critical of the failure of 
the European  architecture to adapt to new challenges, there is an abiding concern in Weiler’s 
work to avoid just the kind of institutional overreach that would either intentionally pursue or 
unintentionally stumble upon the ‘wrong road’ of European Unity or statehood. Whenever the 
reassertion of supranational Europe is seen to involve the accoutrements of statehood, 
whether a written Constitution, or an unqualified sense of the supremacy of European law, or 
any arrangement which would elevate European citizenship above national citizenship in  
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/01 
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Europe's complex matrix of democratic connections, the fear is expressed that this goes too 
far, if not necessarily in the deed or likely consequence then certainly  in the hubristic intent. 
On the other hand, there is a sense that the ills of Europe have become so much “part of a 
deep-seated political culture”8 that they are in any case simply not susceptible to treatment 
through institutional arrangements; or, in a milder version, that institutional reforms 
significantly underdetermine the possibility of genuine transformation which would allow 
supranational Europe to recover its sense of political purpose.
9
 
        By the same token, Weiler does not offer any alternative blueprint to resolve what he 
sees as the ills of Europe. In his work, from Un'Europa Cristiana
10
 onwards, on the complex 
relationship between political values and individual virtue, and in particular the failure of the 
values and structures of political supranationalism to provide a context for the inculcation of 
the very virtues which would allow the sustained realization or renewal of these values, there 
is much reflection on how the 'soft' ethical side of the problem of Community is key, and how 
it must be addressed in its own terms. The danger here, however,  is that the diagnosis, even 
if correct – or, at least, to the extent that it is correct - is simply left hanging, suggesting no 
obvious course of treatment beyond the kinds of institutional reforms he either resists or 
treats  as of  secondary importance. 
                                               
8
 "60 Years Since" n7, 309. 
9
 On one interpretation of his early post-TOE work, Weiler reads like an institutional conservative; as 
someone who, in his own words, approaches the European constitutional design with the attitude, 'if it 
ain't broke don't fix it', and who is of the view that it 'ain't (yet) broke'. See Weiler, "Fischer: The Dark 
Side" in C. Joerges, Y. Meny and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of 
Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer. (Florence: Robert Schuman Centre, 2000). This, however, 
would in my view  be a false reading, or at least an exaggerated one. His conservatism extends only 
to the basic Supranational ideal, and to what he understands as vital to the maintenance of that ideal, 
including the promotion of the idea of Tolerance, and the avoidance of Big 'C' constitutional solutions. 
As his consistent critique of the democratic deficit and as his frequent proposals for reform  make 
clear,  he has always been interested in institutional redesign, even if he sees this as only a modest 
part of the answer to Europe's problems. See e.g. Weiler n3. Chapter 10; "To be a European Citizen: 
Eros and civilization" 
10
 Un' Europa Cristiana: Un saggio esplorativo (Milan:Rezzi, 2003) 
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* 
It is this concern which lies behind the headline of my piece. ‘Half-life’ is a scientific term      
denoting the period of time it takes a substance undergoing irreversible decay to decrease by 
half, and is sometimes used more loosely to depict the condition of terminal decay itself. But 
I approach this stylisation tentatively. The question mark in my title reflects a series of 
genuine uncertainties. First and foremost, over whether, for Joseph Weiler, Europe today has, 
indeed, entered or may be on the verge of entering  the half-life phase. Is the future of 
supranational Europe already or in danger of becoming one of irreversible decline, or, put 
less sensationally, at least one of diffusion, defusion, dilution, fragmentation - of mutation 
into something that is no longer recognisably Big-S Supranational? 
     And insofar as  Weiler's work  does contemplate  the half-life thesis, further exploration is 
require to clarify what this means in terms of both prognosis and diagnosis. As to prognosis, 
even if the canonical  post-war form of the European project  is in secular decline, this need 
not imply either the  expectation of or a preference for a clearly distinct  geopolitical solution 
on the one hand, or a dystopian outcome on the other. Weiler is no flat-earth nationalist, 
nostalgically hankering after, still less anticipating a return to the ‘Westphalian’ paradigm of 
mutually exclusive states. His earlier enthusiasm for and pioneering justification of the 
supranational project makes that perfectly clear. Equally, unlike those who would view  the 
EU's 'natural' evolution as tending towards a more inclusive and less regionally delineated  
complex of  planetary regulation, he is no champion of ambitious models of global 
governance in which cosmopolitan optimism  somehow trumps the opposing  dangers of  
renewed Great Power imperialism or rudderless fragmentation. Instead, the Supranational 
paradigm understood as a singular achievement - according to which there is a common 
trajectory of integration in which all national polities share the same institutions and embrace 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/01 
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the same culture of indefinite common commitment - may simply be exhausted, with no clear 
option either of reversion or of succession. The sense conveyed by Weiler's recent work, 
then, is that the age of Supranationality as a sufficient or even still a relevant model either for 
the European continent itself, or, as has often been urged or assumed, for other regions and 
other operations of transnational governance, may be drawing to an end,
11
 and with no other  
political vision readily equipped to take its place.  
         Yet, even if, in this reading of  Weiler,  both steady state Supranationalism and its 
starkest  alternatives are  ruled out,  that does not mean that we would be left only with a 
residual half-life narrowly and negatively conceived - involving nothing more than the 
gradual corrosion and reduction of Europe’s  dense and complex structure of transnational 
governance. Over the longer term, if we take a more optimistic view, novel vocabularies of 
legitimation and new expressions of collective self-authentication can often be found for 
emergent forms of political practice which are hardly recognised and reckoned for their  
novelty before the new terms are coined.  For history teaches us that it is a paradoxical, Owl-
of-Minervan feature of  much transformative social and political   change  that  forward-
looking reflection and imagination is fired by  the stirrings of  new practice rather than 
offering its  prior inspiration. This is a point, indeed, that Weiler himself once strikingly 
insisted upon in characterising the nascent Supranational Community of the 1950s and 1960s 
itself as a case of Doing before Hearkening
12
 - as a series of  experimental steps which only 
gradually discovered and revealed  their  deeper purpose and direction. In the recent revival 
of a tentative and, admittedly, still   normatively   impoverished language of  multi-speed 
                                               
11
  See my exchange with Weiler on the subject of my essay “The Place of European Law” (57-104) in 
G. De Burca and J.H.H. Weiler The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2012). See esp. "Dialogical Epilogue" 270-278, where he questions the continuing 
significance of the EU as a global archetype. 
12
 Weiler, n3, chapter one, "Introduction: "We all do, and hearten"" 
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Europe   - of flexible or differentiated  Europe - we may see something similar unfolding.
13
 
We may observe the beginnings of a process by which today's profoundly challenged 
Supranationalism may come in time to be understood and articulated as mutating into a new 
and differently legitimated political form     
       Alternatively, if we focus instead on more pressing short-term realities, we may draw a 
less optimistic and more sobering conclusion. One of the salutary lessons of the current, 
already  long-extended Euro crisis, with its progressively destabilising   disconnect  between 
a common monetary policy that produces  highly selective economic hardship  and a fiscal 
policy which lacks either the common pan-European means and commitment or the 
sufficiently other-regarding  resolve of the richer states to  supply a more solidaristic solution, 
is that institutions do not readily disappear or transform themselves  just because they 
become  temporarily or even persistently  dysfunctional. Repeated self-reassertion, in the 
manner of the extensive range and breathless pace of elite institutional initiative we have 
witnessed over the crisis years,
14
 may be no prelude to renewal or to any kind of orderly 
mutation. Rather, it may simply signal obliviousness to or denial of the onset of half-life - the 
dangers of which I return to in the conclusion.    
       Before that, however, we need to attend to Weiler's deeper historical diagnosis of the 
present condition, for this reinforces the sense in his later work of the fading of the 
Supranational paradigm as a matter of waste and atrophy rather than as a productive 
morphosis. Of key significance here are his views about the “messianic”15 origins of the 
Union. Weiler contends, using the Schumann Declaration as Exhibit One, that the fact that 
                                               
13
 See e.g.  J-C Piris The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
14
 From a huge literature, see e.g., the recent  special issue of the European Law Journal edited by 
Damian Chalmers for comprehensive documentation and incisive analysis; Volume 18, Issue 5, 
September 2012.  
15
  See e.g. "Sixty Years Since" n7, 306. 
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certain ideals - Peace and Prosperity again – were at the centre of the original European 
project, both encouraged and was encouraged by a kind of top-down single-mindedness and 
infallibility of purpose amongst  a core group of post- War European leaders.  
      Even if we do not fully buy into the Messianic metaphor of the Promised Land for an 
entity which has so often, and with good reason, been accused  of bureaucratic distance and  
of  failure to ignite the passion of genuine commitment amongst the populations of its 
member states, Weiler is certainly correct in identifying a strongly teleological element in the 
initial European project. In fact, rather than contradictory forces, elite-led passion and a 
quotidian culture of unobtrusive, technocratic rule and quiet compliance might be said to be 
naturally complementary dimensions of a vast socio-political project of such early settled 
purpose. Taken together, moreover, these different features of teleological rule - both the 
impassioned grand vision and the minutely reasoned detail - reflected and cultivated a 
sensibility which, from the early days, stood against contestatory democratic openness and 
allowed  only grudging recognition to those market-correcting rights-claims that might 
temper the preconceived economy-centred project.  Yet, it might be argued, just such a 
background of a more ample democratic culture and a more pluralist menu of basic goods 
might have served  the EU better as it entered its transformative phase in the late 1980s. 
       Weiler’s own take on the absence of democracy from the early EU, in fact, turns out to 
be even more critical than this. His message seems to be less one of missed opportunity than 
of genetic limitation or disability. He claims that “if political Messianism is not rapidly 
anchored in the legitimation that comes from popular ownership, it rapidly becomes alien … 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/01 
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and turns on its creators.”16 Does this mean, perhaps, that by the time of 1992 and all that it 
was already too late for the EU to legitimise its inevitable spurt of post-foundational 
expansion and transformation?  But given that, for Weiler, the messianic or teleological 
element is also at the root of all that is distinctively good in the EU, namely the commitment 
to Peace and Prosperity in an other-regarding transnational environment – was there ever a 
moment where it would have been possible, even in principle,  to introduce democracy early 
enough to ensure that  a narrow Messianism, or teleological perspective,  did not take hold,  
but not so early as to destroy the momentum and sense of common cause without which the 
founding ideals would have been frustrated?  In other words, perhaps on Weiler’s analysis the 
EU was damned to an early grave – a half-life of inexorable deterioration – if it did 
democratise and diversify its basic goods, and equally damned if it did not. 
* 
These points, to repeat, are made tentatively. I merely speculate upon the reasons for and 
implications of what is a distinct shift in tone and perspective from the more open sense of 
normative possibilities Joseph Weiler set out in his path-breaking TOE agenda, and as to the 
extent and precise implications of that shift. Perhaps, though, the half-life metaphor oversteps 
the mark. After all, natural science has no place for the contingencies of human agency, and 
for that reason has never been the best model for the study of politics and society. And if the 
very point of the half-life metaphor is to suggest that the path-dependent pathologies of 
Europe's Supranational project may simply be beyond human remedy, we must beware its 
'scientific' capacity to reduce and distort.  
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       Two further points might be made in clarification of Weiler's mature post-TOE position, 
each of which underlines the need to treat the half-life metaphor with great caution as a 
characterisation of his later work. First, the weight of his analysis has been on the past and 
present rather than the future - on the lessons of diagnosis rather than the vagaries of 
prognosis. Before we ask what  is to be done, we must work out why things are as they, and if 
in so doing we offer no comfortable sense either of continuity or of evolution, then  that 
stands, not as a blanket denial of the possibility of a better future, but merely as an important 
warning against complacency to those in the futures business  His priority has been to  
demonstrate why and how the EU of today, and so also the  EU of tomorrow, has been 
reduced to a more precarious state than many of its supporters  have in recent years typically 
been prepared to concede, and who can say that approach has not been vindicated by the 
onset of the current crisis.   
      Secondly, we should not forget that, for all he sees the European project as having 
eclipsed the selfish concerns of its member states, Weiler retains a distinction between 
generative authority and ethical purpose. For him, Supranationality was a national production 
which came to transcend national self-interest. Equally, his wariness about new institutional 
solutions at the European level is not just a product of a general institutional scepticism, but 
also of a more particular scepticism about the capacity of European institutions to provide the 
fulcrum of change when the wellsprings of legitimacy remain so firmly located in the cultural 
heartlands of the individual states. If Europe is to be made anew, then for Weiler the onus 
will once again lie with "the national communities as the deepest source of legitimacy of the 
integration project."
17
On that view, the inescapability of failure, and of its accompanying 
half-life,  is only plausible within narrow parameters; namely, to the extent that  we cleave to 
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the belief that the Union can be self-transformative rather than requiring to revert to its 
founding parents in times of trouble. 
        My own view, on which I have exchanged views with Joseph before,
18
 is somewhat 
different. I believe that that there is more that we can do from the hard institutional side to 
create the political-cultural wherewithal to pursue common continental  goods; that these may 
not be manifest common goods like Peace and Prosperity - so self-evident that they do not 
require legitimation or discovery by democratic means, but rather constructed common goods 
– generated through  mechanisms of voice and decision at the continental scale;19 that these 
processes need not tend towards a new Unity, nor even significantly endanger remaining 
national processes of will formation; and that the process which led to the failed 
Constitutional Treaty, far from an irrelevance or a hubristic conceit, was actually a missed 
opportunity to generate a broader debate and develop a broader commitment to a 'post- 
Messianic' EU. This is not the place to debate these matters more fully, or to consider 
whether now might be a riper time than the pre-crisis mid-noughties for a process of 
constitutional mobilisation, but merely to acknowledge that my views  involve a degree of 
speculation in  extending faith in the transnational political process, just as Weiler’s involve a 
degree of speculation in the curtailment of that faith. 
         What is not a matter of speculation, however, is that the political backdrop of 2013 is 
not that of 1991, but an even more challenging one. In TOE, Weiler thought it worthy of 
remark, so well-entrenched was the Union by then, that “as recently as the late 1960s, the 
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survival of supranationalism was a speculative matter”20. He set his transformative agenda, 
therefore, against a backdrop of political flux but also long-term security. Today, no-one 
would doubt that the threat to survival is, finally but firmly, back on the political 
radar,
21
however unlikely that might have seemed in the intervening years.   Equally, however 
- and this is one final way in which the half-life label might be useful - the return of a deep-
set fear of demise generates its own counterpoint. Weiler is sensitive to this, singling out 
those prominent members of the current European elite, institutional heads and key national 
leaders alike, who have played and continue to play on the sense of crisis so as to encourage a 
one-way climate of "integration through fear".
22
 Without the Euro and all its works, it is 
proclaimed from these influential quarters, the EU simply cannot survive - a perspective 
which purports to justify the unprecedented range of urgent measures of "executive 
federalism"
23
  we have witnessed in the last two years of Treaty and non-Treaty reform. Yet, 
as Weiler claims, this is an argument from false necessity. It is a means by which widespread 
unease about European decline is exploited  to assert,  in denial of such decline, first, that 
there is only one cure - the preservation of the old order, and, secondly, that there is only one 
potent medicine for that cure - the bitter medicine of monetary constraint and fiscal 
discipline.  
         If Europe as a political project is in doubt, what of Europe as an intellectual project? 
Can we imagine any contemporary cross-disciplinary work on the European Union having 
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  In his annual State of the Union speech on 28th September 2011 the current President of the 
Commission was moved to state that “We are today faced with the greatest challenge our 
union has known in all its history”.http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/us-eu-barroso-
idUSTRE78R0WG20110928  It is testimony to how widespread the language of crisis has 
become in such a short time-frame that what appeared unprecedented in its candour  only two 
years ago has so quickly become unremarkable, even commonplace, in EU institutional 
discourse. 
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the kind of (re)framing influence and lasting impact enjoyed by TOE?  A TOE 2013-vintage, 
if such a project were to be attempted, would be written from a decidedly more precarious 
place than that occupied by Joseph Weiler  in 1991. It is a project that, to succeed, would 
require at least as much historical sensitivity and perspicacity as its illustrious predecessor, 
and perhaps even greater foresight. 
 
